THE LOW FERTILITY TRAP – by Put up-liberal Pete
The issue of collapsing world-wide birth-rates is a fancy matter however I’ll state my thesis baldly firstly: there’s a massive overlap between the issues that underpin long-standing worldwide birth-rate declines and the issues that underpin our prosperity. Because the biologist John Aitken has put it:- ‘The basic reason behind human fertility decline is prosperity.’ Subsequently, birth-rate declines are arduous to undo and reverse as a result of to unpick low-fertility dangers additionally unpicking our prosperity too. Subsequently, pronatalists face an uphill battle, to place it mildly. Pronatalism (a time period used to explain advocates for insurance policies geared in the direction of growing fertility charges) is nothing new however has gained higher salience in recent times on account of quickly rising old age dependency ratios throughout the OECD nations specifically. The Economist stories that the share of nations with pro-natalist insurance policies has grown from 20% in 2005 to twenty-eight% in 2019. In any evaluation of the deserves or demerits of pronatalism it is very important differentiate between liberal and intolerant types of pronatalism. In its intolerant guise, pronatalism will be motivated by an unsightly ethno-nationalist undercurrent which views pronatalism as a method of avoiding what it perceives to be the evils of mass-immigration, which is seen in catastrophic phrases as tantamount to ethnic substitute and racial/civilisational suicide. However this type of pronatalism is, at finest, a fringe view on this nation and I am not going to waste my time critiquing a set of views which aren’t held by anybody with any actual affect or energy.
My critique is aimed on the much less sinister and extra liberal type of pronatalism which holds sway over a higher swathe of policy-makers. There are bad-faith critics who will attempt to collapse the 2 types of pronatalism into one and faux that every one types of pronatalism are inherently morally suspect, however this isn’t a view I subscribe to. My critique of liberal pronatalism is just not that it’s inherently morally problematic to utilise varied insurance policies to attempt to encourage extra individuals to have youngsters. Pronatalism, in its liberal type, is a superbly respectable set of coverage goals. My argument is pragmatic, not moralistic. My argument is that liberal pronatalism is solely not going to work. Because the authors of Empty Planet’ clarify:- ‘the “low-fertility lure” ensures that, as soon as having one or two youngsters turns into the norm, it stays the norm. {Couples} now not see having youngsters as an obligation they have to carry out to fulfill their obligation to their households or their god. Moderately, they select to lift a baby as an act of non-public fulfilment. And they’re shortly fulfilled.’
My critique of liberal pronatalism additionally seeks to keep away from falling into the lure of dichotomising financial versus cultural components, a bent which tends to obscure, moderately than illuminate, evaluation of fertility developments. As an illustration, urbanisation is related to birth-rate declines (present estimates point out that 70% of the world’s inhabitants might be dwelling in city locales by 2070 and it is already at 83% within the UK) however is urbanisation a cultural issue or an financial issue? a little bit of each is the reply. Economics or tradition is subsequently a false dichotomy. In predominantly rural societies, youngsters are an additional pair of palms and an insurance coverage coverage in opposition to previous age and illness when there are not any social security nets, so, in that sense, an financial issue. I as soon as labored with a West African woman (who had been born and raised in a rural location) who described her 5 youngsters as actually her “pension.” It is a vivid illustration of the methods during which youngsters are considered as financial property in predominantly rural societies and stands in stark distinction to urbanised societies, such because the UK, the place youngsters are broadly considered primarily when it comes to being an financial value, moderately than an additional pair of palms and an insurance coverage in opposition to previous age and illness. In industrial and postindustrial societies, full with in depth social security nets, and with work positioned away from dwelling in a manufacturing unit or in an workplace, versus at dwelling on a smallholding or a farm, the financial equation of getting youngsters is basically altered.
Nevertheless, cultural components are additionally at play. When massive households are the social norm inside a tradition then this tends to turn into mutually reinforcing. Having a small household, or no youngsters in any respect, when everybody else round you might be having massive households, routinely makes you the odd one out. People are social creatures with an intuition to evolve and this creates a level of path-dependency with respect to fertility-levels, which might make them troublesome to alter with no basic alteration in materials circumstances. Moreover, individuals in rural societies usually tend to stay close to an prolonged family-network. Whereas in city societies, with its higher diploma of geographical mobility, inhabitants churn and social dislocation, proximal household networks are typically changed with co-workers and college mates and the like. Because the authors of ‘Empty Planet’ clarify, this has ramifications for fertility as a result of ‘members of the family encourage one another to have youngsters, whereas non-kin don’t.’
The grandmother effect is an actual phenomenon. Research has demonstrated that having a dwelling maternal grandmother will increase the variety of offspring born by their daughters by about 20% while one other study discovered {that a} grandparental demise results in a discount of roughly 5 share factors within the five-year chance of childbirth amongst their offspring. The grandmother effect offers us an perception into among the cultural components which underpin larger fertility charges in predominantly rural societies, provided that in rural areas persons are extra possible, on common, to stay close to extended family and given that there’s a constructive and statistically significant association of parental support with adult daughters’ entry into parenthood. Contraception, as a technological issue, is one other good instance of the false dichotomy between economics versus tradition as regards analysing fertility developments. Contraception measures, resembling condoms or the tablet, are a fabric concern, however their take-up is influenced by cultural components. We are able to see this fairly clearly with respect to the British whole fertility price which fell in 1877 on account of a change to social norms when a guide about contraception triggered a controversial censorship trial. Contraception is a fabric issue, however the take up of assorted types of contraception are influenced by modifications in social norms, that are cultural. Evidently, economics versus tradition, versus economics through tradition, is the fallacious body for an evaluation of fertility developments.
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Regardless of widespread a number of decades-long panic about overpopulation, birth-rates are on the decline internationally. Again in 1800, in all areas of the world, on common, girls gave delivery to six infants every. Even as much as 1965 the common girl gave delivery to five infants. Since then the number has halved. Globally, the common per girl is now under 2.5 youngsters. Within the 2015–2020 interval, the whole fertility price was 1.61 youngsters per girl in Europe, 1.65 in Jap Asia, 1.75 in North America, 2.04 in Latin America, 3.25 in Northern Africa, 3.46 in Oceania (excluding New Zealand and Australia), and 4.72 in sub-Saharan Africa. The Financial Times stories that ‘’two-thirds of worldwide residents stay in a rustic the place the fertility price is lower than 2.1 births per girl, roughly the extent required for populations to stay secure if mortality charges are low.’ In 1900 youngsters fashioned 40% of the American inhabitants, in 2022, simply 22%. Additionally that year, 61% of US adults lived in a family with a baby underneath age 15, however by 2020 that had fallen to 29%. In Europe, solely 29% of households embody youngsters, in Sweden that drops under 20%.
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Fertility declines have mixed with will increase in life expectancy to supply quickly ageing societies. Scott Galloway has written that ‘globally, the variety of individuals older than 80 is anticipated to extend sixfold by 2100. In the meantime, the inhabitants of youngsters 5 and youthful will get halved.’ The New York Times has reported that ‘in 2020 the median age of developed nations was 42, up from 29 in 1950.’ The Economist stories that ‘the wealthy world at the moment has round three individuals between 20 and 64 years previous for each one over 65. By 2050 this ratio will shrink to lower than two to 1. That may necessitate later retirement ages, larger taxes or each.’ In the meantime, The Guardian stories that ‘Japan’s ageing inhabitants is already affecting almost each side of society. Greater than half of all municipalities are designated as depopulated districts, faculties are closing and greater than 1.2 million small companies have homeowners aged about 70 with no successor.’ While The Times stories that ‘in the meanwhile, there are about 28 pensioners per 100 working individuals, however it will rise to 39 by 2070. If nothing modifications, the Workplace for Finances Duty says that age-related spending should rise from 15% of GDP to about 26%.’
A quickly ageing inhabitants has apparent implications for the general public funds. The state pension is the most important single merchandise of welfare spending within the UK (£104.86bn in 2021/22) and makes up 42% of the whole welfare spend. The Times stories that ‘the price to the taxpayer of funding college tuition is 8% of the quantity spent on state pensions yearly (£10 billion in comparison with £124 billion).’ While the OBR estimates that ‘the ageing of the inhabitants, and the related rise in age-related spending, places regular upward strain on public spending and would see public debt greater than double to over 250 per cent of GDP by 2070 if no additional fiscal motion is taken.’ Low fertility has big implications for public coverage usually, as indicated by tutorial research which estimates that ‘if fertility ranges within the UK don’t change for the rest of this century, the nation’s immigration ratio might want to rise to 37% by 2083 to keep up a ample working-age inhabitants.’ Ageing societies additionally threat calcifying into gerontocracies with quickly growing ranges of intergenerational inequality. As an article in The Times put it, ‘a rustic with fewer youngsters inevitably allocates extra assets and extra energy to older individuals.’ While CapX stories that within the UK ‘one in 4 pensioners is a millionaire, while the median pensioner….already has extra disposable earnings than the median employee, and is prone to have higher wealth.’
Consultants who research demography refer to those mixed units of inhabitants modifications because the demographic transition. The demographic transition began in North-West Europe round 1800 — the whole fertility price in France, for example, dropped by 20% between 1800 and 1870 alone —and has been slowly spreading outwards to the remainder of the world since then. This demographic transition has been revolutionary in its implications. As demographer Ronald Lee explains:- ‘earlier than the beginning of the demographic transition, life was quick, births have been many, development was sluggish and the inhabitants was younger. Throughout the transition, first mortality after which fertility declined, inflicting inhabitants development charges first to speed up after which to sluggish once more, shifting towards low fertility, lengthy life and an previous inhabitants. The transition started round 1800 with declining mortality in Europe. It has now unfold to all elements of the world and is projected to be accomplished by 2100. This international demographic transition has introduced momentous modifications, reshaping the financial and demographic life cycles of people and restructuring populations. Since 1800, international inhabitants dimension has already elevated by an element of six and by 2100 could have risen by an element of ten. There’ll then be 50 instances as many aged, however solely 5 instances as many youngsters; thus, the ratio of elders to youngsters could have risen by an element of ten. The size of life, which has already greater than doubled, could have tripled, whereas births per girl could have dropped from six to 2. In 1800, girls spent about 70 % of their grownup years bearing and rearing younger youngsters, however that fraction has decreased in lots of elements of the world to solely about 14 %, on account of decrease fertility and longer life.’
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Simplified drastically, as nation after nation have secularised, industrialised, urbanised, and increased its educational levels, birth-rates have fallen (as ranges of affluence have risen.) This has big implications. Because the authors of ‘Empty Planet’ put it:- ‘The nice defining occasion of the twenty-first century—one of many nice defining occasions in human historical past—will happen in three a long time, give or take, when the worldwide inhabitants begins to say no. As soon as that decline begins, it would by no means finish. We don’t face the problem of a inhabitants bomb however of a inhabitants bust, a relentless, era after era culling of the human herd. Nothing like this has ever occurred earlier than…..Inhabitants decline isn’t a very good factor or a nasty factor. However it’s a massive factor. A toddler born immediately will attain center age in a world during which circumstances and expectations are very completely different from our personal. She is going to discover the planet extra city, with much less crime, environmentally more healthy however with many extra previous individuals. She received’t have hassle discovering a job, however she could wrestle to make ends meet, as taxes to pay for well being care and pensions for all these seniors eat into her wage. There received’t be as many colleges, as a result of there received’t be as many youngsters.’
Financial incentives can clearly affect human behaviour but when financial incentives alone defined fertility declines, no matter context, then it might be comparatively simple to repair the issue, simply bung a load of money at individuals of child-bearing age and watch the whole fertility price in a given space go up and up, however sadly, many nations have tried variants of this strategy already with very limited results. A part of the issue right here, it appears to me, is that policy-wonk think-tank sorts are those who write about this topic greater than anybody else and policy-wonk sorts are naturally inclined to stress facets of the issue which is likely to be amenable to policy-levers, which are typically principally financial, and to downplay issues that are much less amenable to alter through coverage, components that are typically principally cultural. We depend on policy-wonks for his or her particular information about specific topics however they have a tendency to have their very own biases. One in all which tends to be the assumption that one thing will be achieved regarding the specific issues that type the locus of their space of experience. A policy-wonk is incentivised to all the time imagine that one thing will be achieved with respect to their space of experience as a result of in any other case: what are they doing precisely? Nevertheless, typically little or no can realistically be achieved with respect to sure intractable issues. Within the case of birth-rate declines, if the identical components that play a task in fostering birth-rate declines additionally play a task in fostering our prosperity then reversing these birth-rate declines will possible contain big unattractive trade-offs that most individuals can be unwilling to just accept.
Financial incentives clearly matter on the subject of choices about having youngsters, however maybe not in the best way some individuals think about. There may be an unexamined assumption that the first motive why birth-rates have declined is just because having youngsters has turn into extra unaffordable to a higher swathe of the inhabitants, however whole fertility charges have been really lots higher when we were much poorer and poorer nations, resembling these in Africa, have a lot larger whole fertility charges than nations which might be much more prosperous, resembling these in Europe (three times as high in fact.) Clearly there may be extra to this matter than meets the economists eye. Restrictive planning legal guidelines resulting in excessive housing prices, which then preclude younger individuals from turning into home-owners (which is a real problem,) are sometimes adduced as a major issue behind declining delivery charges on this nation. That is even supposing extra homes have been inbuilt Tokyo than in the entire of England since 2008 however but Tokyo has a complete fertility price of just one.04, which isn’t solely decrease than the remainder of Japan but in addition decrease than the speed within the UK too, which at the moment stands at 1.56 youngsters per girl. The concept a scarcity of reasonably priced housing is the first motive why birth-rates are so low is just not a idea which matches the out there proof.
British birth-rates dipped under replacement-rate fertility ranges so far as again because the early-1970’s and have stayed under replacement-rate ranges ever since then, however our current housing problems, whereby individuals of their 20’s and 30’s wrestle to get on the housing ladder, dates again solely to the 1990’s (on the earliest.) Dwelling possession charges for these aged between 25 and 34 was as excessive as 51% in 1989 and whilst lately as 2011, 43% of the 25-to-34 age group have been owners, however by 2022, this had diminished to 24%. Excessive housing prices, and low home-ownership charges amongst younger individuals, are an actual downside, however they aren’t the first motive why the UK has a under replacement-rate fertility degree. Low birth-rates predate our present housing issues and the instance of Tokyo signifies that constructing extra homes is not going to, in of itself, do a lot, if something, to extend the birth-rate. If elevated housing affordability was the straightforward path to elevated fertility-levels then we’d count on to see larger fertility ranges in nations like Japan and South Korea however that’s not what we see.
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The identical applies to childcare. Childcare prices within the UK are exorbitant. The Financial Times estimates that a median dual-earner, two-child household in England, spends about 40% of its disposable earnings on childcare (as in comparison with 5% in Germany.) Our childcare system is estimated to be the third most expensive childcare system on the earth (behind solely Slovakia and Switzerland.) There isn’t a query that it is a major problem that requires severe options however childcare prices will not be the first motive why the UK has a under replacement-rate fertility-level. Our low birth-rate predates our current childcare issues and in nations which have common free childcare, resembling Nordic nations like Finland, we don’t see an considerable enhance within the birth-rate. In Norway, for instance, the common household solely spends 8% on childcare and fogeys additionally share 49 weeks of parental go away at full pay, however but their whole fertility price can also be under replacement-rate ranges and, as lately as 2020, was decrease than the UK price at 1.48 births per woman in comparison with 1.56 births per woman within the UK.
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Urbanisation, which typically accompanies industrialisation, creates the circumstances for our trendy ranges of prosperity, through agglomeration results, however modifications the financial equation of getting youngsters from one in all an financial funding to one in all an financial legal responsibility. Steadily this results in much less individuals having youngsters and (mixed with elevated life-expectancy) ends in an ageing society with a reliance on immigration to make up for the shortfall within the workforce. Ageing societies, resembling Japan, with out excessive ranges of immigration, are inclined to turn into economically stagnant and find yourself racking up big ranges of debt on account of a declining variety of employees and an growing variety of people who find themselves economically inactive. While ageing societies, resembling these in Europe, who’ve turn into reliant on immigration to make up for the shortfalls of their working-age inhabitants, find yourself being roiled by nativist backlashes within the type of repeated waves of right-wing populism (which have occurred in nation after nation following large-scale immigration.)
Tinkering across the edges of the issue with varied coverage proposals associated to tax, housing and childcare, while well-meaning, misunderstands the depth and the complexity of the issue. The components which might be related to excessive ranges of fertility, not simply urbanisation, but in addition religiosity, reductions in child mortality, high marriage rates (plus marrying younger) and feminine educational levels — John Aitken states that ‘the training of girls has in all probability achieved extra to curtail human fertility than the whole plethora of contraceptive applied sciences and pronatalist Authorities insurance policies added collectively’ —will not be issues that we’re prone to reverse, or, in some instances, even, issues that we really need to reverse anyway. So this presents us with an existential societal dilemma. Financial stagnation through low fertility and low immigration, like we see in Japan, or infinite proper wing populist nativist backlashes through low fertility and high-immigration, like we see in Western Europe and North America. On condition that these are the opposite choices, it’s unsurprising that liberal pro-natalists cling to the consolation blanket that we will simply shift the dial on fertility by tinkering with insurance policies associated to tax, housing, childcare and the like.
Liberal pronatalists cite the truth that individuals will typically report, when requested, that they need to have extra youngsters than they at the moment have as proof for the need of pronatalist policy-making. Nevertheless, if you happen to requested the common individual whether or not we must always enhance taxes to pay for public companies then they’d additionally possible say sure however this doesn’t essentially imply that they need to pay extra tax personally themselves. No one needs to be obese both and if you happen to requested somebody who was obese or overweight whether or not they needed to drop some pounds then they’d invariably say sure however that doesn’t essentially imply that they’re keen to make the life-style modifications that might be needed to attain this in an obesogenic atmosphere geared in the direction of sedentary dwelling and with the ever-present availability of highly-caloric meals. Likewise, within the summary, individuals will usually say that they need to have extra youngsters than they at the moment have however that doesn’t essentially imply that they’d be personally keen to make the precise trade-offs that might be essential to facilitate this in an anti-natal atmosphere.
In Vegard Skirbekk’s description of sub-Saharan Africa, in his guide ‘Decline and Prosper,’ we get a glimpse into what a high-fertility tradition really appears to be like like:- ‘in contrast with the remainder of the world, sub-Saharan Africa has comparatively excessive ranges of illiteracy (34% in 2018) and low training. There are fewer financial alternatives and infrequently restricted entry to contraception. Folks on this world area are typically extra spiritual, are inclined to have extra conventional household values and fatalistic attitudes towards childbearing are widespread. Childbearing and marriage stay near common, and majorities marry at a comparatively younger age. Inside marriages, childbearing is usually anticipated and is the idea for authorized, social, and cultural methods.’ A high-fertility tradition can be one which was much less urban, extra religious, in all probability with much less birth control, actually with more teenage births, close to common and early marriages, extra unplanned pregnancies, and one during which girls began having youngsters a lot earlier, possible foregoing manifold academic {and professional} alternatives within the course of. In a very high-fertility tradition, there would additionally possible be much less emphasis on the significance of labor and training usually too. Some individuals would welcome a retraditionalised society that was much less city, extra religious, and one during which extra girls had decrease ranges of training and fewer profession alternatives as a result of they have been having youngsters a lot earlier, however many individuals would most actually not welcome this set of modifications.
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The purpose being that liberal pronatalists don’t even spell this out however supply a deceptive narrative as a substitute that we will have every part that we wish with out having to make any vital trade-offs. Lots of the issues that liberal pronatalists advocate, resembling making home-ownership extra broadly out there, are effectively price doing, however they’re unlikely, in of themselves, to extend the birth-rate by a lot, if in any respect, and positively not in any sustained style. The low-fertility lure that we’ve discovered ourselves in goes a lot deeper than simply housing, childcare and tax methods and is rooted in a demographic transition that has come to all societies which have industrialised, urbanised, secularised and elevated their academic ranges. Urbanisation has given us prosperity but in addition modifications the financial equation of getting youngsters from an financial funding to an financial legal responsibility. Urbanisation can also be related to modifications in social and cultural norms too which serve to mutually reinforce a low-fertility orthodoxy additionally.
Even the post-second world conflict baby-boom does not supply us a viable road-map out of the low-fertility lure provided that it possible occurred as a result of younger girls have been denied alternatives within the labour market on account of discrimination. If the baby boom was brought about, not less than partially, by diminished feminine labour pressure participation then this isn’t one thing that liberal pronatalists can be keen and even capable of reverse with out the chance of widespread immiseration and political controversy. Immigration doesn’t supply us a viable long-term solution to this downside both provided that migrants who transfer from larger to decrease fertility societies are inclined to undertake the decrease fertility patterns of the host nation. Immigration maximalism in response to declining birth-rates tends to be unpopular and polarising however so are the opposite conceivable options to the issue of ageing societies and declining working-age populations, whether or not that be raising pension ages or investing in automation and robotics.
The reality is that there isn’t a easy pat reply to this downside however on the very least we needs to be trustworthy with ourselves that this downside is just not one thing that we will resolve just by tinkering across the edges with housing, childcare and tax insurance policies. As Norwegian inhabitants economist and social scientist Vegard Skirbekk has written:- ‘fertility typically tends to be larger in areas the place the inhabitants is much less educated, the place extra persons are illiterate, and the place there may be extra poverty and fewer financial alternatives.’ If these are the components related to high-fertility then most individuals would fortunately select low-fertility. The fact is that the components which underpin low-birth price developments are additionally the components that are inextricably linked with the prosperity of the nations with low birth-rates and subsequently we will not simply unpick one with out additionally risking the unravelling of the opposite. As Vegard Skirbekk has written, ‘fertility tends to be larger in areas the place the inhabitants is much less educated, extra spiritual, poorer, and extra rural.’ This sample of dwelling is just not one which individuals within the UK are prone to discover a horny choice.
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Delayed childbearing is a big issue underpinning fertility-declines and has turn into the norm within the UK. The IFS has reported that ‘the common age at turning into a mom has elevated by a yr per decade since 1970. In 1970 the common age at first delivery was 23.7 years, by 2000 it was 26.5 years and in 2019 it stood at 28.9 years.’ While The Guardian reported in 2022 that ‘in 1971, simply 18% of 30-year-olds {in England and Wales} had no youngsters – immediately the determine has risen to 50%.’ Bobby Duffy stories, in his guide ‘Generations,’ that in England and Wales in 1985, six instances as many infants have been born to youngsters as to girls aged over 40. However by 2015, the variety of youngsters born to girls aged over 40 was bigger than the quantity born to these aged underneath 20, for the primary time in our historical past.’
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This isn’t an instance of British exceptionalism both. Delayed childbearing has more and more turn into the norm in industrialised and urbanised countries in general. Vegard Skirbekk writes that ‘given the postponement of childbearing noticed in the US and plenty of different extra developed nations, age-related decline in fecundity has turn into an essential driver of modern-day childlessness in industrialised nations.’ That is even supposing after the age of 30, girls are considerably extra prone to miscarry, to offer delivery to youngsters with congenital diseases and in addition to stay childless on account of declining fecundity. One piece of analysis estimated that 27 years old is the oldest age a lady ought to begin childbearing for a 90% probability of getting 2 youngsters. To reverse the sample of later childbearing would possible take extra than simply policy-tinkering with housing, childcare and tax methods nonetheless. Reversing the sample of later childbearing would additionally possible require some type of retraditionalising of social and cultural norms pertaining to gender roles, contraception, religiosity and marriage, that might not solely be past the scope of presidency to socially engineer, however would additionally, in all probability, be extremely controversial and unpopular additionally. We’re additionally not going to de-urbanise both even supposing urbanisation is among the key drivers of low-fertility.
None of this to indicate that we must always do nothing about falling birth-rates or that falling birth-rates are of no consequence. Falling birth-rates are sometimes analysed when it comes to their wider societal ramifications, whether or not that be when it comes to economic or cultural stagnation, however falling birth-rates have deep private penalties on a person degree too. Falling birth-rates means fewer brothers, sisters and cousins for our youngsters to socialize with and a lonelier world for them usually as they get older. Rising charges of childlessness are additionally a worrying pattern provided that participation in marriage and household life are related to lower suicide-rates and a longer lifespan. Low fertility charges are additionally a contributing issue to diminished ranges of social trust usually. However we are going to by no means have the ability to deal with the constellation of points entangled with low-fertility with no clear-eyed evaluation of how we obtained thus far, and that’s one thing which liberal pronatalism seems to be unwilling or unable to offer. We also needs to bear in mind that falling birth-rates have some benefits too. An ageing society is one that’s much less prone to have violent crime, for example, provided that young men all over the place are accountable for almost all of violent crime. In any case, the low fertility lure is a part of a demographic transition that occurs to each society which industrialises and urbanises, it isn’t one thing that we will eradicate through policy-tinkering neither is it utterly detrimental in each single respect. There are not any simple solutions to the issues that the low fertility lure poses and we’d do effectively to be sceptical of anybody who proposes in any other case.
