Web3’s faux model of Internet historical past

Chris Dixon is a common associate at Andreessen Horowitz (a16z), one of the crucial influential Enterprise Capital companies on the planet. He’s Web3’s single greatest investor, and its most prominent evangelist.
And he’s simply atrocious at explaining the historical past of the Internet.
Dixon made his cash within the web of the ‘00s and ‘10s. He works with Marc Andreessen, the iconic “golden geek” of the ‘90s web. The man has been round lengthy sufficient to know higher. When he will get the historical past of the Internet fully mistaken, he’s doing so with intent. And he has been prominently, boldly getting this mistaken for YEARS. Nobody appears to name him on it. I don’t perceive why.
(Sure I do. It’s as a result of he’s wealthy and well-connected. Selecting fights with him over one thing like “the historical past of the online” has little upside. It’s a type of issues that solely a tenured professor who isn’t on the lookout for a lot analysis funding would trouble with.)
Here’s the brief history of the Web, as Dixon tells it:
Web1 (roughly 1990-2005) was about open protocols that have been decentralized and community-governed. A lot of the worth accrued to the perimeters of the community — customers and builders.
Web2 (roughly 2005-2020) was about siloed, centralized companies run by firms. A lot of the worth accrued to a handful of firms like Google, Apple, Amazon, and Fb.
We at the moment are originally of the web3 period, which mixes the decentralized, community-governed ethos of web1 with the superior, fashionable performance of web2. Web3 is the web owned by the builders and customers, orchestrated with tokens.
Dixon first articulated this historical past in a 2018 essay titled “why decentralization matters.” He sharpened the claims in a 2021 essay titled “Why Web3 matters.” He has talked about it repeatedly on Twitter and in interviews. Final month, a16z launched its newest “State of Crypto Report.” (The inestimable Molly White broke down the absurd highlights in a Twitter thread. ) Web page 5 of the report (which is admittedly only a slide deck. Due to course it’s.) reiterates this timeline.
The timeline is a stylized account of the web’s evolution — from the decentralized protocols of web1 to the scale and superior performance of web2 — making a justification for (1) why the blockchain-based way forward for the online is worth it, (2) why it’s well timed, and (3) why it’s (in Dixon’s view) inevitable. (Each fifteen years, we begin a brand new chapter of the Web’s historical past. The beginning of the decentralized/ tokenized/blockchain-enabled Internet period is correct on schedule. Don’t miss out on the possibility to speculate early!)
Broad historic narratives are a bit like statistical fashions — “all models are wrong, but some models are useful.” After all historical past is extra messy and complex than that. But when the overall define is smart, and if it helps us make sense of the current, then the trouble is justifiable.
However let me supply a corollary: “all fashions are mistaken, however some are wronger than others.” And the issue with Dixon’s mannequin is that it extraordinarily, ceaselessly, aggressively mistaken. It’s the kind of mistaken that may be helpful for hawking unregistered Web3 safety merchandise (err, sorry, I imply, play-to-earn games), however is in no way helpful for really understanding the event of the web.
1990-2005 wasn’t a single, contiguous period of “open decentralized protocols” and worth accruing to the perimeters of the community. There have been (not less than) three eras in that timespan. Solely the primary (1990-95) had these qualities. As quickly as the cash received large, issues modified drastically.
2005-2020 wasn’t a single period both. Once more, there have been not less than three eras in there. And solely the final one or two match his description of “siloed, centralized companies” with worth accruing to the massive tech firms. The years that the majority clearly characterize the “net 2.0” period have been characterised by social sharing and mass collaboration. It was solely later that the platforms calcified and the “enshittification” cycle started in earnest. (h/t Doctorow)
A more in-depth have a look at the historical past of the World Large Internet is a warning flare towards Dixon’s funding portfolio. It makes plain that the Web has at all times had a monopoly downside, and that the first device for limiting monopoly energy is an lively regulatory state. It gives fixed reminders that monetary incentives are inclined to distort and destroy group habits.
Beneath, I sketch an alternate mannequin of the historical past of the online. This can even be a stylized account (historical past is far too difficult to divide neatly into five-year increments). However my account has the good thing about being usually extra true, whereas additionally placing the brittleness of the Web3 narrative on full show.
The historical past of the Internet, divided into neat, five-year increments.
1990-1995: Internet Prehistory
The net in 1990 was mainly nonetheless only a white paper by Tim Berners-Lee. Hell, when WIRED journal launched in 1993, the journal made no point out of the World Large Internet. The writers targeted on the approaching digital revolutions of interactive tv and digital actuality as a substitute. Bulletin Board Companies have been a sizzling matter in 1993. The journal’s first characteristic story on the World Large Internet didn’t appear until October 1994.
Two key options of this time interval: the Web was nonetheless noncommercial (h/t Ben Tarnoff) and the Web consumer base was nonetheless tiny (h/t Kevin Driscoll). That is essential to understanding why open, decentralized protocols flourished again then: to be an web consumer circa 1991, you have been both hanging out on native Bulletin Board Programs otherwise you have been logging on by means of college analysis networks. Laptop engineers collaborated on standard-setting with minimal company interference, as a result of the massive firms (like Apple, IBM, and Microsoft) simply weren’t serious about networked computing but. There was no cash in it.
However that will change. For the Internet to get actually large, it must broaden past the hobbyists and researchers.
1995-2000: Internet 1.0/the increase years
You would argue for beginning the “Internet 1” period in 1993, with the introduction of the Mosaic browser. Actually, 1995 makes way more sense. That’s when the foundations towards business exercise have been eradicated, and it’s additionally when the Netscape IPO attracted curiosity from Wall Avenue and from mass media. 1995 is the beginning of the Dotcom increase. The Dotcom increase brings finance-types into the tech scene, irrevocably altering the tradition. The Dotcom increase additionally throws cash at a whole lot of tech startups, fueling the build-out of broadband web connections.
One characteristic of the Dotcom increase was Microsoft’s central position because the “Huge Tech” behemoth of its day. Michael Lewis chronicles this dynamic in his guide, The New New Thing, about Jim Clark and Netscape. Clark knew precisely what he was doing by taking Netscape public so shortly in 1995. Netscape had a dominant share of the nascent browser market, and no income mannequin to talk of. It additionally had a large, ticking clock, counting down in direction of “MICROSOFT.”
Home windows 95 was the working system of virtually each private pc again then. Invoice Gates had initially dismissed the Internet, however Clark knew that wasn’t going to final. Finally Microsoft was going to construct its personal browser, package deal it with the working system, and wipe out Netscape’s market share. That’s precisely what occurred, by means of a collection of anti-competitive practices that will grow to be central to the DOJ’s antitrust case against Microsoft.
This isn’t precisely buried historical past. Everybody listening to the Web in the course of the Dotcom increase has reminiscences of the “browser wars.” The Microsoft antitrust swimsuit was entrance web page information. The rise and fall of Netscape was one of many defining moments of the period. (And Dixon, specifically, ought to recollect it as a result of his workplace is down the corridor from Netscape’s cofounder, Marc Andreessen!)
2001-2005: The Dotcom Crash and the Gradual Restoration
The Internet of 1999 was filled with empty bravado. Firms with no marketing strategy have been going public, turning early workers into paper millionaires. Alan Greenspan was warning of “irrational exuberance,” whereas tech thinkers have been insisting {that a} new economics of abundance had arisen. The previous guidelines, they argued, merely didn’t apply.
Issues regarded totally different after the Dotcom crash. Firms like Pets.com turned punchlines. Enterprise Capital funding dramatically shrank. The swaggering confidence of the dotcom increase gave solution to a brand new, tentative established order. Extra folks have been on-line than ever earlier than, and there have been nonetheless vital tech breakthroughs throughout this time interval (iPod, iTunes, mass adoption of Wifi, mass adoption of social community websites, wikipedia, and many others…), however Silicon Valley had misplaced its collective mojo.
To bundle the crash years along with the Dotcom increase years is a bit like lumping the Obama years and the Trump years collectively. Certain, they have been chronologically shut, and featured lots of the similar folks. However the variations are what outline them.
And once more, simply to drive this level residence: Dixon’s “open protocols which might be decentralized and group ruled” are nowhere to be present in 1998 and 2003. Jim Clark took Netscape public so he may purchase a superyacht earlier than Microsoft took a hatchet to his enterprise mannequin. The iTunes retailer was many issues, but it surely was by no means decentralized nor community-governed. Microsoft was Huge Tech earlier than Huge Tech was all that large. And what slowed Microsoft down wasn’t decentralized competitors. It was antitrust enforcement, proper up-to-the-minute the Bush administration determined to cease imposing antitrust.
2005-2010: Internet 2.0
That is one spot the place the timeline is frustratingly oversimplified.
The time period “Internet 2.0” was coined by Tim O’Reilly in 2005. However the phenomena it described — the blogosphere and Wikipedia and social community websites, simply to call a number of — date again a number of years earlier than that. I wrote about this final 12 months, in an essay titled “when was the blogosphere?” The blogosphere was a quintessential net 2.0 phenomenon, and it begins someplace between 1997 and 2003. (I pin the date at 2002 for the political blogosphere. Tech running a blog began properly earlier than that.)
Kevin Kelly articulated what was new right here in his 2005 essay “We are the Web”: “What all of us did not see was how a lot of this new world could be manufactured by customers, not company pursuits.” The Internet 2.0 phenomenon was about user-generated content material. Folks, forming on-line networks and communities, have been creating music and artwork and journalism. They have been sharing tales and creating worth for one another. Nobody was getting wealthy but, however everybody gave the impression to be getting concerned.
What O’Reilly actually does is put a reputation to the factor. It was, in impact, a load-bearing branding train. He offers it power and kind by shaping the best way that traders, inventors, journalists and the broader public view the following iteration of the Internet. The impacts are actual — as soon as the Internet 2.0 branding sinks in, Enterprise Capitalists get excited once more, and the investments begin to stream.
Chris Dixon was round for Internet 2.0. Hell, Chris Dixon received wealthy off of Internet 2.0. So it’s putting that Dixon’s description of “Web2 (2005-2020)” bears no resemblance to the precise Internet 2.0 years (I’m calling it 2005-2010 right here for simplicity’s sake, however peak Internet 2.0 might be extra like 2004-2009). The Internet 2.0 years weren’t about “siloed, centralized companies run by firms.” That got here later.
If you wish to perceive what Internet 2.0 regarded like on the time, learn Kevin Kelly’s “We are the Web.” Learn Clay Shirky’s Here Comes Everybody, or Yochai Benkler’s The Wealth of Networks, or Henry Jenkins’s Convergence Culture. Or, in case you desire video, watch Michael Wesch’s 2008 lecture, “An anthropological introduction to YouTube.” Wesch and his college students documented the habits of the early YouTube group, again when YouTube nonetheless was a group… earlier than the cash get large, that’s.
For all that speak about Web3 communities, they’ve received nothing on Wikipedia or early YouTube. Peak Internet 2.0 featured ample remixing and content material creation and participatory tradition. It didn’t final (it possible couldn’t final!), however we shouldn’t confuse it with the factor that changed it.
2010-2015: The Platform Period.
Internet 1.0 ended with a bang; Internet 2.0 died with a whimper. Nobody fairly seen that it ended. Some attribute its demise to the smartphone and the app-based ecosystem which supplanted the open Internet. Others attribute it to Fb launching a developer platform and developing a walled backyard that might rival the open Internet. Nonetheless others blame a cultural shift in Silicon Valley itself — after the 2008 monetary disaster, one other wave of Wall Avenue/finance varieties migrated to Silicon Valley. What as soon as had been residence of A/V Membership nerds was lastly dominated by frat bros.
Regardless, the factor that clearly modified someday round 2010 was that the web communities of the ‘00s receded in significance. As an alternative, the platforms themselves turned the locus of energy. To cite Joanne McNeil, this was proper across the time when “a person became a user.”
These have been the years of Buzzfeed and Upworthy, of the disastrous “pivot to video,” and the rise of the “influencer” as a profession path. The cash, merely put, had gotten large. (And big money ruins everything.)
These are additionally the years when internet time slowed down. The tempo of on-line change form of stalls out after the iPhone and iPad come to market. The most important tech companies outright purchase any upstart rivals. The promise of the “sharing financial system” turns into the grim realities of the “gig financial system.” Enterprise funding pours into Uber and AirBnB and WeWork and hundreds of different startups. Huge tech turns into the largest sector of the financial system, whereas additionally settling into place and producing little that’s really new anymore.
Discover, nonetheless, that that is extra of an antitrust story than it’s a Internet 2.0 story. Antitrust enforcement has been important to the lengthy historical past of the Web. IBM flourished as a result of Bell was cautious of entering into {hardware}. IBM stayed out of software program due to a consent decree, leaving a gap that Microsoft exploited. Microsoft received tied up in years of lawsuits for being too aggressive in attempting to dominate the Internet. Then the DOJ stopped imposing antitrust coverage, and it took lower than a decade for monopoly energy to return roaring again. Just a few centralized tech companies come to dominate within the 2010s due to lively coverage choices by the federal government. If you wish to keep away from this situation, you want extra regulatory scrutiny, not much less.
2016-2021: The Techlash Years
(…Once more, this begins in 2017 quite than 2016. Historical past doesn’t match into neat compartments. I’m simply offering a tough guidepost right here.)
It’s fascinating that Dixon whistles previous the techlash. It isn’t as if it escaped his discover. These are the years when Amazon and Fb and Google and (to a lesser extent) Apple all lose public belief. Executives begin usually getting referred to as earlier than Congress. Venues like WIRED take a tough important flip of their reporting. Huge tech will get a black eye within the public sq., whereas sustaining report income.
I believe the only solution to perceive the techlash is that this was the time interval when Silicon Valley began being held accountable for the current as a substitute of being evaluated primarily based on their visions of the long run. Huge Tech had moved to the middle of the financial system and public life. Software program, in Marc Andreessen’s phrases, had “eaten the world.” With all that nice energy got here nice accountability, and tech elites completely hated all that important consideration.
And that brings us to the present second.
2022-today: Trying to find the Web’s Subsequent Chapter
I’ve written about this beforehand (“Tech Futurism’s Blind Spot”). It has at all times struck me that the push to outline the following chapter of the Web (“Metaverse! Web3! AI! Oh my!”) has been pushed by tech elites’ starvation to show the web page on the techlash years. They need to return to being judged primarily based on their ambitions, quite than their outcomes.
That’s partially about vibes. When you will have all the cash and energy, what you really need is for folks to deal with you want a cool techie startup man once more. (Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg circa 2022 would love to be handled like Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg circa 2012 once more, pleaseandthankyou.)
But it surely’s additionally about regulation. The USA is lastly beginning to get severe about antitrust once more. The EU is flexing its regulatory muscle, forcing the tech platforms to regulate their habits. The previous tech libertarian ethos of the Nineties dictated that authorities ought to keep out of Silicon Valley’s means. By this line of pondering, the engineers and innovators have been constructing the long run a lot too quick, and all authorities may probably do was get in the best way. Cracks have shaped within the facade of the old Silicon Valley ideology. The tempo of on-line innovation slowed down and stabilized within the 2010s. Higher to get again into the enterprise of boldly creating the long run than threat having regulators aggressively assert their authority.
You may see this thirst for the following net all around the a16z State of Crypto report. (Certain, 2022 was the 12 months of the crypto crash. However don’t get caught up in every thing that went mistaken final 12 months! Give attention to the optimistic alerts that issues may go higher this 12 months…)
You may see it within the dying embers of the metaverse hype cycle. (Possibly Apple’s Augmented Actuality glasses will lastly spur mass adoption! Oh wait, they’re gonna price $3,000, and may be delayed once more? Alright, however simply think about what will probably be like as soon as the value comes down…)
And you may see it within the discourse surrounding Generative AI. (Lastly, a breakthrough expertise that appears like magic… one with actual use instances, that individuals are really utilizing… Overlook its present limitations and social vulnerabilities. Let’s give attention to the world that it would create!)
Clearly Generative AI will determine into the Web of the 2020s. Among the many three competing visions of the following Web, the AI proponents have emerged victorious. It’s too early to say what it should finally seem like. It’s not too early to manage how it’s deployed and monetized.
And, consequently, there’s a really actual sense wherein Web3 is already yesterday’s digital future. The crypto crash in 2022 silenced a lot of the Web3 hype bubble. You learn a lot much less about DAOs and play-to-earn games than you probably did a 12 months or two in the past. The tech journalists who spent early 2022 insisting “with all the cash and expertise in that area, there should be one thing actual there” have collectively reached the conclusion that it was scams all-the-way-down in any case.
Dixon has guess large in Web3 although. He has an excessive amount of staked to surrender on it simply but. So he retains committing to this faux retelling of historical past wherein Web3 is of course what comes subsequent. The historical past is unnecessary. It by no means made any sense. It ought to have been a large crimson flag the second he began retconning the ‘90s, ‘00s, and ‘10s.
I’d be prepared to offer Web3 proponents the good thing about the doubt if the folks selling this have been a bunch of 20-somethings who grew up on the planet constructed by Google and Fb. “Look,” I’d say, “you’re fully mistaken. Possibly learn a guide as a substitute of a Hacker Information thread. I can suggest a pair.”
However Chris Dixon was there for an excessive amount of of the historical past of the Internet to be making harmless errors right here. When he erases Microsoft from the ‘90s Internet, it isn’t as a result of he by no means heard of the browser wars. When he conflates the participatory Internet 2.0 years with the platform years that adopted, it’s an intentional omission. He’s getting the essential historical past mistaken as a result of it serves his strategic functions as a Web3 investor and evangelist.
The open protocols of the early 90s have been an artifact of a time when the online was nonetheless pre-commercial. The participatory net of the mid-00s was a pleasant cultural second that solely lasted till the cash received enormous. That’s why and the way “take rates” become A Thing That Chris Dixon Could Complain About. No one nervous about MySpace or Friendster’s take fee, as a result of no person was creating wealth by means of these websites to start with.
why Web3 has turned out to be a lot scammier than the web of the 90s and 00s? The reply is easy. It’s the identical motive why Willie Sutton robbed banks (“As a result of that’s the place the cash is!). You may’t code group participation and belief into the blockchain. As soon as the cash will get large, the social incentives get skewed. Within the full absence of regulation, individuals are going to run enormous scams.
We’ve seen the consequence. Web3 has been a disaster for everybody however the early traders and the scammers. Chris Dixon constructed a mannequin of Internet historical past to assist promote his investments. All fashions are mistaken, however some fashions are wronger than others
When the historic narrative appears off, mistrust the one that is delivering it.
It’s signal that their actual aim is to keep away from the teachings of historical past.